Transition to Centralized Unit Commitment
An Econometric Analysis of Colombia’s Experience

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Abstract
This paper attempts to shed light on the relative merits of centralized electricity markets with multipart bids and dispatch using an MIP-based unit commitment optimization approach vs. self-committed markets with linear energy supply curves. We conduct an empirical study of data from the Colombian market, which in 2009 transitioned from a self-commitment paradigm to a centralized unit commitment approach where generators offer a linear supply function for energy along with start-up costs while the commitment and dispatch are determined by the system operator using MIP-based optimization. The results indicate that the transition to centralized dispatch has resulted in productive efficiency gains through a decrease in production costs. However, these gains have not translated into wholesale price decreases; in fact, wholesale prices increased after the change in the dispatch approach. These results suggest that productive efficiency gains have been captured by suppliers through the exercise of market power.

Keywords
Centralized Unit Commitment, Productive Efficiency, Market Power.
1. **Introduction**

System operators (SO) in electricity markets have the responsibility of balancing supply and demand of electricity at each moment in time, taking into account all of the constraints in the system. One of the most important elements of this task is the dispatch of generators.

There are essentially two ways of determining which generators are to be dispatched in restructured electricity markets. In self-committed markets, generators place bids for energy production and the SO chooses the least-cost producers. In centrally committed markets, generators submit their cost of production and their fixed start-up (and possibly no-load) cost. These fixed costs are taken into account in the optimization problem resolved by the SO and are used to calculate an uplift payment to dispatched generators that does not fully cover their fixed costs through their energy revenues. In contrast, in self-committed markets, generators can only recoup their start-up costs directly through their energy bids.

Of course, efficiency requires that the lowest-cost producers be chosen at each moment in time and that these costs include the generators’ start-up costs. Thus, at first glance, centrally committed markets may seem preferable. However, the change in rules also affects the strategic behavior of agents, who may have greater opportunities for misreporting information. Therefore, it is not clear which method is superior.

Indeed, there has been a debate in the literature about this issue. Some authors, such as Ruff (1994), Hogan (1994), Hogan (1995) and Hunt (2002) prefer centrally committed markets. On the other hand, Oren and Ross (2005) show that generators may have incentives to misreport their bids. Wilson (1997) and Elmaghraby and Oren (1999) suggest that self-committed markets may end up being more efficient when bidders’ strategic behavior is taken into consideration. Sioshansi and Nicholson (2011) analyze the equilibrium behavior in both designs and show that there are opportunities to misreport in both. Thus, while all SOs in the United States have adopted a design based on voluntary centralized unit commitment for day-ahead markets, so far the theoretical literature has not been able to determine which method is superior. Thus, this important market design question remains an empirical one.

In this paper, we shed some light on the foregoing debate by taking advantage of a natural experiment performed in the Colombian electricity market, where the market
design was changed in 2009\(^1\) from a self-committed one to a centrally committed one. We perform a comprehensive analysis of the Colombian market before and after the change and reach two main conclusions. First, the centrally committed market contributed to higher productive efficiency.\(^2\) Second, we find evidence that marginal cost markups and prices after 2009 were also higher than they would have been under the regime before the change, possibly as a result of an increase in exercise of market power by generators. These findings suggest that consumers have not benefitted from efficiency gains and although productive efficiency has increased, the additional strategic flexibility of generators has reduced consumers’ surplus; depending on demand elasticity, this could have resulted in reduced social welfare. We show that this is true even if we ignore spot prices and focus only on the average price of bilateral contracts.

This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe Colombia’s electricity market rules before and after 2009. We also describe the unit commitment problem that the system operator XM (Compañía de Expertos en Mercados) solves and how each plant is remunerated. Section 3 contains a description of the data used. The econometric analysis is presented and discussed in Section 4 where we argue that productive efficiency has increased since 2009. Section 5 provides evidence of an increase in market power after 2009 and that efficiency gains were not passed on to consumers through lower prices. Section 6 contains the conclusions.

2. The problem

In this section we briefly explain Colombia’s spot market design before and after the implementation of resolution 051/2009.\(^3\) We focus on the domestic market and exclude international exchanges with Venezuela and Ecuador.\(^4\)

Beginning in 2001, Colombia operated a day-ahead market where each generator offered a single bid for energy production for the next 24 hours. The system operator (SO) used these bids to determine which generators would produce. For the spot

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\(^1\) The change was implemented by Resolution 051/2009, enacted by Colombia’s energy regulatory agency, the Comisión de Regulación de Energía y Gas (CREG).

\(^2\) By this we mean lower total cost of production.

\(^3\) Unless stated otherwise, references herein to “before regulation 2009” means the period from enactment of the 2001 regulation until enactment of the 2009 regulation. In the 2001 reform, CREG imposed the constraint that all bids are to be fixed for the entire day.

\(^4\) The dispatch and spot market in these international exchanges is subordinated to the domestic market which is by far the most important. Hence, from the perspective of this study, focusing on the domestic market is appropriate.
market and energy dispatch prior to Regulation 051 (i.e., before 2009), there are three relevant points in time: day ahead (economic dispatch), real-time dispatch (real dispatch) and day after (ideal dispatch). The main features of the economic dispatch are:

a) Plants submit two-part bids: a minimum price at which they are willing to generate during the next 24 hours along with their maximum generation capacity for each of the next 24 hours.
b) Plants inform the system operator (SO) on what fuel and plants configuration should be used for solving the unit commitment problem.
c) The system operator estimates the following 24 hours total demand for each hour.
d) Basic technical characteristics of plants are taken into account: a ramp model for thermal plants (minimum uptime, minimum downtime, etc.), minimum energy operating restrictions for hydro plants, etc.
e) Automatic generation control (AGC) restrictions are taken into account.
f) Transmission restrictions are given.
g) Every day, the economic dispatch optimizes the following function:

\[
\sum_{t=0, ..., 23} \sum_{i} b_i \times q_{i,t}
\]

where \(b_i\) is the price bid by plant \(i\) for the next 24 hours and \(q_{i,t}\) is the production of plant \(i\) in hour \(t\) subject to hourly AGC, transmission, demand and technical constraints (ramps), environmental restrictions, etc.

This optimization defines the economic dispatch for every hour and provides a scheduling plan for energy generation for the next 24 hours.

Real-time generation sometimes deviates from the planned economic dispatch for a variety of reasons: demand turns out to be slightly different than the demand estimated on the previous day, energy losses, overloaded lines, etc. Therefore, the system operator has to fine-tune the actual dispatch in real time.

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5 The Colombian electricity market is not, in a strict sense, a spot market. The energy price defined in this market is calculated ex-post by an optimization program and used to settle energy consumption and production among market participants. To be consistent with standard Colombian terminology, we refer to the market and its price as “spot market” and “spot price,” respectively.

6 Due to technical characteristics, once a thermal plant is started it must be on for a minimum time (minimum up time). The same is true when a thermal plant is shut down (minimum downtime).

7 Power grids require closely balanced real time generation and load. Automatic Generation Control (AGC) is a system for adjusting the power output of multiple generators based on frequency deviations.
Once the real generation for the 24 hours has occurred, the system operator calculates the ideal dispatch, which is an ex-post calculation used for settlement purposes. The optimization problem solved is the following:

\[
\min_{p_{lt}} \sum_i b_i \times q_{i,t}
\]

\[
s.t.
\]

\[
D_t \leq \sum_{l} q_{l,t}
\]

where \( b_i \) is the price bid by plant \( i \) for the next 24 hours, \( q_{i,t} \) is the production of plant \( i \) in hour \( t \) and \( D_t \) is actual demand at time \( t \). Notice that the ideal dispatch is determined through an hour-by-hour optimization problem.

The ideal dispatch forms the basis for calculating the spot price.\(^8\) Once the optimization problem of the ideal dispatch is solved for every hour, the market clearing price is calculated as the price bid by the marginal plant that is not saturated and which is needed to meet demand\(^9\). We denote this equilibrium price as \( b^m_t \). The hourly spot price \( P_t \) is defined as this equilibrium price, \( P_t = b^m_t \) (since 2009, the spot price is modified by an uplift as explained below).

Since the real dispatch turns out to be different than the ideal dispatch, side payments are implemented to pay for any differences.\(^10\)

After the regulation of 2009, the ideal dispatch solves a centralized unit commitment problem. Rather than minimizing the hourly costs of generation, the objective function was set as equal to the objective function of the economic dispatch (24-hour optimization problem), generators submit complex bids and side payments were introduced. The bids specify an energy offer price for the next 24 hours, start-up costs for the next three months and maximum generation capacity for each hour in the next 24 hours.

Once the optimization problem of the ideal dispatch is solved for the 24 hours, the equilibrium price \( b^m_t \) is calculated as the price bid by the marginal plant that is not

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\(^8\) More precisely, this is a settlement price since technically speaking there is no spot market. Following the local usage of the term, we will continue to refer to this as a spot price.

\(^9\) A plant is saturated when it is operating under inflexible conditions; intuitively, when it cannot change its output without violating technical restrictions. For example, a thermal plant in the middle of ramp is a saturated plant.

\(^10\) These are called reconciliaciones, both positive and negative.
saturated. The hourly spot price \( P_t \) is defined as this equilibrium price plus an uplift, \( \Delta I \), where the uplift is defined in the following way.

Let

\[
I_i = \sum_{t=1}^{24} q_{i,t} \times b_t^m
\]

be the plant’s \( i \) income according to the ideal dispatch and:

\[
C_i = \sum_{t=1}^{24} q_{i,t} \times b_i + \sum_{t=1}^{24} s_i u_{i,t}
\]

be the plant’s \( i \) generating cost (assuming truthful bidding), where \( s_i \) is plant’s \( i \) start-up costs and \( u_{i,t} \) is a dummy variable that is 1 if the plant is operating in period \( t \) and 0 otherwise.

Now let \( q_{i,t}^s \) be plant \( i \) energy production at the time when it is saturated (0 otherwise) and \( PR_i \) the positive reconciliation price\(^{11}\). Then the uplift is defined as:

\[
\Delta I = \frac{\sum_i \max\{0, C_i - I_i\} + DI_i}{\sum_{t=1}^{24} D_t}
\]

where:

\[
DI_i = \sum_{t=1}^{24} q_{i,t}^s \times (\max(b_t^m, PR_i) - b_t^m)
\]

The hourly spot price is defined as:

\[
P_t = b_t^m + \Delta I
\]

Therefore, the spot price guarantees that demand will pay for the start-up of dispatched plants and energy production by saturated plants. Having defined the spot prices, we now explain the settlements for the various agents. Agents are paid the spot price for any unit of energy produced (regardless of whether the plant is saturated or not) and hydro plants reimburse the \( \Delta I \) component of the price for each unit of energy produced, while thermal plants for which \( C_i \leq I_i \) also reimburse the \( \Delta I \) component of the price and thermal plants for which \( C_i > I_i \) make no reimbursement.

\(^{11}\) For the objectives of this study, an explicit definition of this price is not relevant.
3. Data

The Colombian electricity sector is a hydro-dominated but diversified system. Figure 1 shows a time series since 2001 of the share of hydro and thermal generation (as a proportion of total generation). The figure also shows the spot price.

![Generation by Type vs Price](image)

**Figure 1**: Panel A (upper) shows thermal vs. hydro generation as a proportion of total generation. Panel B (lower) shows the spot price in Colombian pesos per KWh.

Some of the key variables that have to be estimated for the econometric analysis in the next section are the marginal costs and opportunity costs of water. We take a standard, pragmatic approach commonly used in the economic literature (Borenstein et.al. (2002), Mansur (2008)). The methodology for estimating the marginal costs of plants whose principal fuel is coal and natural gas is based on: (1) the heat rate for each plant; (2) fuel calorific value; (3) fuel price (P); (4) variable operating and maintenance costs (VOM); and (5) taxes (CERE and FAZNI). Then the marginal cost of thermal plants is:

$$\text{Marginal Cost} = \frac{\text{Heat Rate}}{\text{Calorific Value}} * P + \text{VOM} + \text{CERE} + \text{FAZNI}$$

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12 CERE is a tax per unit of generation that redistributes revenues among generators to cover firm energy. FAZNI is a modest tax used to finance energy infrastructure in remote regions of Colombia. Data available from: [http://www.alvaroriascos.com/research/data/](http://www.alvaroriascos.com/research/data/)
We use fuel price time series adjusted by calorific value and transport costs from UPME\(^{13}\) while heat rates are taken from SO web page for all thermal plants. Also, we use different VOM costs: US$5/MWh for natural gas plants and US$6.9/MWh for coal plants.

The daily official exchange rate (TRM) is from Banco de la República\(^{14}\) is used to express marginal costs in pesos. CERE time series data are obtained from SO databases. FAZNI are calculated by taking into account resolutions CREG 005 (2001) and CREG 102 (2006). These resolutions set FAZNI at 1COP/kWh indexed to the PPI (Producer Price Index) month by month. According to the resolutions, the value is reset to 1COP/kWh in December 2006 and thereafter is indexed to the PPI. The PPI is taken from DANE.\(^{15}\)

The opportunity cost of water is one of the most difficult variables to pin down. We estimated the opportunity cost of water in one hour as the minimum between the plant’s bid price and the marginal cost of the most expensive thermal plant operating during that hour.

Our econometric analysis is based on a panel of 50 plants operating from January 1, 2006 to December 31, 2012, and which are responsible for more than 95% of total generation.

4. Econometric analysis

This section describes an econometric evaluation of the welfare consequences of Resolution 051/2009 using data made available by the Comisión de Regulación de Energía y Gas (CREG, the Colombian regulator for electricity markets) and XM (the system operator). The methodology used in this study closely follows the methodology used by (Mansur, 2008) to evaluate the effects of the market restructuring in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Maryland in 1999. This method is more sophisticated than the standard method used by Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak (2002), which compares market outcomes with an ideal competitive benchmark that ignores start-up costs. That is, the standard method assumes that whenever a plant has a lower marginal cost than the spot price, it should have been used in the competitive benchmark. However, it may be optimal not to use a plant with a low

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\(^{13}\) Colombia’s energy and mining planning department (Unidad de Planeación Minero Energética): http://www.sipg.gov.co/sipg/documentos/precios_combustibles

\(^{14}\) Central Bank of Colombia.

\(^{15}\) Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, the official national statistics agency.
marginal cost but high start-up costs if it is not required to run for long. Therefore, the standard method overestimates the welfare losses in the actual market. Mansur proposes a dynamic model that produces a more accurate evaluation of welfare losses. This methodology is particularly relevant for our study, since start-up cost is one of the central aspects of Resolution 051/2009.

Specifically, we estimate two models. The first, an output decision model, estimates the quantity of energy produced as a function of price-cost markups in the present, past and future. The actual decision to produce or not will depend on these markups. In order to control for other relevant information that may affect agents’ output decisions such as the opportunity costs of water, we carry out two exercises: (1) instrument the spot price using available water resources in rivers (an exogenous variable) and (2) use water resources in rivers as a direct control of the output decision model. Results for the first exercise are reported below and for the second exercise, they are contained in the technical supplement to this article. Our conclusions are robust to these specifications. We calibrated the first model with data before 2009, when the resolution changed the rules, and we used it to simulate the (counterfactual) production that would have been obtained if there was no rule change in 2009.

The second model adapts the methodology described in Mansur’s appendix A and estimates prices as functions of demand, controlling also for El Niño and La Niña effects. More details about these procedures and our overall evaluation strategy are given in the next section. This econometric model is a reduced form model that ignores agents’ strategic behavior.

Our results indicate that Regulation 51 has improved welfare by reducing production costs. However, the observed prices are higher than the simulated prices that represent the spot price that would have prevailed in the absence of regulation (counterfactual). Moreover, these results do not change when we consider start-up costs. The simulated counterfactual prices and estimated marginal and opportunity costs imply that after Regulation 51 was implemented, markups have increased. This suggests that although dispatch has been more efficient, there has been considerable exercise of market power to the detriment of consumers. In Section 5 we show that this is still the case even if we use contracted prices rather than the spot price.

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16 Available at: http://www.alvaroriascos.com/research/electricitymarkets/
a) Output decisions

Firms’ production decisions are estimated using data from before 2009. In this model, production predictions are constructed both before (in-sample estimation or model fit) and after the reform (out-of-sample estimation or forecast). In general in a dynamic model, assumptions about how firms create expectations of future prices are important, whereas here we focus on the correlation between future prices and production. Therefore, the model asserts that a firm’s current output depends on historical, current, and future price-cost markups ($pcm_{it}$).

$$pcm_{it} = P_t - c_{it} \tag{1}$$

where $i$ denotes a particular firm, $t$ is the hour of the day, $P_t$ is the spot or simulated price and $c_{it}$ is the marginal or opportunity cost.

Then, output $q_{it}$ before 2009 is specified as:

$$q_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta_{1,i}pcm_{pos_{it}} + \beta_{2,i}pcm_{it} + \beta_{3,i}pcm_{i,t-1} + \beta_{4,i}pcm_{i,t+1} + \beta_{5,i}pcm_{it} + \beta_{6,i}pcm_{i,t-24} + \beta_{7,i}pcm_{i,t+24} + \gamma_0nino + \gamma_1nina + F + \epsilon_{it} \tag{2}$$

where $\alpha_i$, are unit fixed effects, $pcm_{it}$ is the average markup for the day, $pcm_{pos_{it}}$ is a binary variable equal to 1 if there was a positive markup for firm $i$ at time $t$ and 0 otherwise and $F$ represents fixed time effects (for hours, weekdays and months). Note that specific characteristics like minimum uptimes, minimum downtimes, load costs, start-up cost, ramping rates, etc., do not vary significantly in time and are indistinguishable from the unit fixed effects $\alpha_i$, which captures all of this variation. To make the model more flexible, all variables except $\alpha_i$ and $pcm_{pos_{it}}$ are estimated using fifth-order polynomial functions\textsuperscript{17}. This model has more variables than Mansur’s model in order to adapt the methodology to the Colombian electricity market. First, it includes two indicator variables that are very important for all agents and generating units and that represent El Niño and La Niña phenomena. These variables capture climate changes in the Pacific Ocean that affect precipitation in the country.

To consistently estimate equation (2) using ordinary least squares, it is important that markups are not correlated with the error terms. Since output and markups (prices) are jointly determined in equilibrium, this is most likely not the case. Furthermore, excluding the potential strategic interaction among firms by ignoring output decisions of other firms (other than $i$) in equation (2), we are potentially omitting variables, which also calls into question the independence of markups and the error term. As a

\textsuperscript{17}The online technical supplement to the paper shows that using sixth-degree polynomials is not better than using fifth-degree polynomials.
result estimated coefficients may be biased. We have tried to mitigate some of these potential econometric problems by introducing instrumental variables and reporting the sensitivity analysis for the main results. Below we provide a discussion of these issues. First, in order to get a sense of the model's fit and the role of introducing a more flexible specification, we report estimation results for the model with no polynomials or calendar fixed effects.

Table 1, with neither polynomials nor calendar fixed effects, shows the average coefficient for each variable across all plants, the average standard error and the number of firms (of a total of 46) for which the coefficient is significant at a 95% confidence level. The $R^2$ of this model is 0.06 and the variables are significant in most of the units evaluated, with the unit fixed effect and El Niño and La Niña phenomenon being key variables in almost all models. Also the coefficient signs of most variables are intuitive. The full model estimation with calendar effects and polynomial has an $R^2$ of 0.17. Tables 2 and 3 report the same results by resource type. There is a notable difference in coefficients between El Niño and La Niña variables for thermal and hydro plants, which is consistent with our intuition.

Taking into account the high level of concentration in the Colombian electricity market, it is plausible that companies are not behaving as price takers. This is why endogeneity might be a problem in the models above. Even though the analysis has been performed at the unit level, it is possible that companies strategically influence the markup by engaging in price setting and for that reason a final specification of the model is tested using instrumental variables. There are at least three possible candidates for instruments: the maximum energy production capacity, bilateral contracts and water resources in rivers. The first was discarded because of insufficient variability: it didn't change at the hourly level and hardly at all from day to day. The bilateral contracts variable is theoretically very interesting.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plants</th>
<th>Average of Coefficients</th>
<th>Average of Std. Errors</th>
<th>No. of Coefs. Significant(5%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
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<td>46,478</td>
<td>44</td>
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<td>pcmpos</td>
<td>913,875</td>
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<td>pcm</td>
<td>24,386</td>
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<td>1,879</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>meanpcm</td>
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<td>2,635</td>
<td>33</td>
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Table 1. Summary of Model for All Plants

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plants</th>
<th>Average of Coefficients</th>
<th>Average of Std. Errors</th>
<th>No. of Coefs. Significant(5%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>meanpcmminus24</td>
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<td>37</td>
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<td>nino</td>
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<td>43</td>
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<td>nina</td>
<td>-125,379</td>
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Table 2. Summary of Model for 17 Hydro Plants

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<th>Average of Std. Errors</th>
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</tr>
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<td>(Intercept)</td>
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<td>15,697</td>
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<td>nina</td>
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<td>27,353</td>
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Table 3. Summary of Model for 29 Thermo Plants

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<th>Plants</th>
<th>Average of Coefficients</th>
<th>Average of Std. Errors</th>
<th>No. of Coefs. Significant(5%)</th>
</tr>
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<td>pcmpos</td>
<td>29,178</td>
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<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>pcm</td>
<td>3,026</td>
<td>883</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>pcmminus1</td>
<td>3,267</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>pcmplus1</td>
<td>2,129</td>
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<td>22</td>
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<td>883</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>nino</td>
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<tr>
<td>nina</td>
<td>-26,537</td>
<td>11,829</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the moment in time when prices are set, this variable can be taken as exogenous and captures some of the most relevant information for bidding in the day-ahead market. If the firm is “long” on energy then it will be in its interest to bid high, in order
to set the price as high as possible. Unfortunately, there are several issues that hinder the use of this instrument. First, the data are not available by unit but by company, eliminating part of the richness of the data. Moreover, there are five units that didn’t enter into any contracts and many firms had very few contracts before 2009, reducing the estimation sample substantially. Despite these shortcomings, we performed some tests with the available data. In this case the correlation between the instrument and the markup is 0.3 and the $R^2$ of the first stage averages 0.12. Nevertheless in the second stage of the estimation we didn’t find a good fit. The third variable—water resources in rivers—is also interesting as an instrument. Below we report results for this case.\(^\text{18}\)

Figure 2 compares the estimated (in-sample) aggregate supply curve (before 2009) to the observed aggregate supply curve (in-sample).

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{aggregate_supply.png}
\caption{Aggregate supply using observed and adjusted prices}
\end{figure}

The graph suggests that at least on average, the aggregate fitted (simulated) supply curve is similar to the actual supply curve.

\(^\text{18}\) The complete estimation of the model using instrumental variables is described in the technical supplement to this document, which is available at: http://www.alvaroriascos.com/research/electricitymarkets/
We also run a second exercise in which we estimate the output decision model using water resources in rivers as a covariate rather than as an instrumental variable. The technical appendix to this document shows similar results, particularly in our welfare evaluation of productive efficiency.

b) Prices

As noted in the previous section, the key independent variable is the markup, which is determined by the price. In order to construct a better counterfactual, it must be acknowledged that the reform may have changed the market and consequently the prices. Therefore, following Mansur’s appendix A, a counterfactual price $\hat{p}_t$ is simulated for the period after the reform, using the dynamics before the reform.

Here the relationship between prices in the pre-2009 period and aggregate output is examined. The coefficient of aggregate output is allowed to vary by hour-of-day $i$ (and hour-of-day fixed effects are included) and a 10-part piecewise linear spline function (split by decile for each hour) is used. We also control for El Niño and La Niña indicators:

$$P_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \sum_{j=1}^{10} \beta_{i,t,j} D_{i,t,j} + \gamma_0 nino + \gamma_1 nina + e_t \quad (3)$$

where $D_{i,t,j}$ is zero for every $j$ except when $D_{i,t}$ is in the $j$-th decile of the empirical distribution of demand for day $i$ in hour $t$. For this $j$, $D_{i,t,j} = D_{i,t}$. This function is extremely flexible and fits the pre-restructuring data with an $R^2$ of 0.92. With these estimated coefficients, a second series of prices is simulated after 2009. As in Mansur’s paper, this method requires a common support. The range of demand before 2009 was 2,393,873 to 9,107,534 kWh. After 2009, demand increased and the range was 3,828,775 to 9,298,119 kWh. Finally, predicted prices are adjusted to reflect the actual variance observed in the post-restructuring period.

Before 2009, the standard deviation of the unadjusted predicted prices ($P_t$) (model fit or competitive benchmark) is much lower than that of actual prices (15.37 and 30.73, respectively). In order to increase the variance, we use the residuals from the regression of equation (3) based on the pre-2009 data. First, an AR(1) process is fitted to the residuals:

19 There were only two values (121,228 and 798,678) below this number.
\[ \hat{e}_t = \hat{\rho} \hat{e}_{t-1} + u_t \] (4)

The estimated coefficient is \( \hat{\rho} = 0.8 \). Then, using a Monte Carlo simulation, we simulate a new series \( \hat{e}_t \) by drawing from the sample distribution of \( u_t \). Finally, the error is added to \( p_t \), to get the adjusted predicted prices. We repeat this process 100 times and average the results. Figure 3 shows the observed and simulated aggregate supply function. The figure suggests and upward shift in the supply function consistent with increasing market power since 2009. The following two figures (Figure 4 and Figure 5) show the observed prices and the simulated prices before and after the reform. Notice that the model predicts lower prices even if we compare them to marginal price (Max. Offer) after 2009. These results raise the concern that the spot price increase after 2009 is not due to marginal costs but most likely due to market power.

![Observed/Counterfactual Aggregate Output After Restructuring](image)

Figure 3: Observed aggregate output and counterfactual aggregate output

For the period before 2009, the simulated prices are close to the observed prices, whereas after the restructuring the volatility is similar but the simulated prices are consistently lower than those observed. This is

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20 Recall that the spot price after 2009 is the marginal price or maximum price offered by the marginal, non-saturated plant dispatched in the ideal dispatch, plus an uplift.
interesting since, as we will see below in the welfare comparisons, the empirical evidence strongly indicates that the new market design based on centralized unit commitment has improved welfare, relative to the counterfactual. Yet the prices we estimate for the counterfactual are lower than those observed, suggesting that exercise of market power has increased.

The next figure (Figure 4) makes it clear that simulated prices are consistently lower than the actual prices (the sample fit before 2009 is almost perfect when averaged by hour and by day; hence the Actual Pre. line cannot be seen in the figure).

![Price by hour of day](image)

*Figure 4: Average observed price by hour before and after reform (Actual Pre, Actual Post respectively) and model adjustment before reform (Sim. Pre) and prediction after reform (Sim. Post)*
c) Counterfactuals

Using the previous two models we perform the following exercise. We use the output decision model estimated from observed markups before 2009 to simulate output (self-unit commitment) after 2009, but using simulated markups. In this case we interpret output as what would have been observed if no regulation had been introduced.

d) Welfare Effects

Welfare effects measurements are based on direct production costs, i.e., variable costs excluding start-up costs. Below we analyze the role of start-up costs in this simulation. Assuming that variable costs are represented by a linear function, the welfare effect of the regulation (deadweight loss) is estimated in the following way:

$$\Delta W = \sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{i=1}^{N} c_{it}(q_{it} - \tilde{q}_{it})$$  \hspace{1cm} (5)
where \( q_{it} \) is the observed output of plant \( i \) during period \( t \), \( \hat{q}_{it} \) is the simulated output and \( c_{it} \) is the marginal or opportunity cost.

### Variable costs

Table 4 reports the results of this evaluation after normalizing aggregate simulated output per hour. To be more precise, the output decision model simulates higher output than actual demand. This could explain why the variable cost of producing energy in the counterfactual could be higher than the actual cost. Hence, we normalize simulated output so that simulated aggregate output supply is equal, hour by hour, to aggregate demand. In Table 4 actual outcomes correspond to observed values for aggregate output and aggregate variable costs. For the counterfactual we report aggregate output (normalized), total variable costs, deadweight loss and dead weight loss share.\(^{21}\) The results suggest that centralized unit commitment has improved productive efficiency since its introduction.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>2006-0</th>
<th>2007-0</th>
<th>2008-0</th>
<th>2009-0</th>
<th>2010-1</th>
<th>2011-1</th>
<th>2012-1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actual Outcomes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Variable Costs</td>
<td>3205</td>
<td>3556</td>
<td>3253</td>
<td>2534</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>1769</td>
<td>3184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Counterfactual</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Variable Costs</td>
<td>3552</td>
<td>3864</td>
<td>3463</td>
<td>2711</td>
<td>913</td>
<td>2099</td>
<td>4071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deadweight loss</td>
<td>-347</td>
<td>-308</td>
<td>-210</td>
<td>-177</td>
<td>-103</td>
<td>-330</td>
<td>-887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DWL share</td>
<td>-10.84%</td>
<td>-8.67%</td>
<td>-6.44%</td>
<td>-7.00%</td>
<td>-12.70%</td>
<td>-18.66%</td>
<td>-27.87%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Output is measured in millions of MWh. Total Variable Costs and Deadweight loss are measured in $COP Billions\(^{22}\).

### Start-up costs

As mentioned at the start of this section, for welfare comparisons we have excluded additional costs due to start-up. We find two difficulties in estimating these costs. First, although before 2009 we can count the number of start-ups using generation data (real dispatch), we don’t have data for start-up costs (before 2009, plants did not report startup costs); and second, the econometric model, being a linear model, is not

\(^{21}\) Deadweight loss (DWL) share is calculated as welfare change as in equation (5) divided by actual (observed) aggregate variable cost.

\(^{22}\) A Billion is \(10^9\).
tailored for estimating start-ups in the counterfactual. To overcome these difficulties and get a sense of the actual start-up costs and hence a better measure of welfare changes, we estimated start-up costs before 2009 using the methodology reported in the online technical appendix. Then, using real generation, we estimated aggregate (observed) start-up costs before and after 2009; the results are shown in the next table. From Table 5, it is evident that after 2009 start-up costs oscillated between 0.76% and 1.46% of variable costs and before 2009, they ranged from 0.76% and 1.08%. Since we find it difficult to estimate start-up costs in the counterfactual using our model, we assume that the start-up costs after 2009 in the counterfactual were also between 0.76% and 1.08%. We obtain an upper bound on welfare changes due to start-up costs by assuming actual costs of 1.46% after 2009 (for every year) and counterfactual costs of 0.76% for every year. It follows that the welfare gains shown in the previous table, based on variable costs, overestimate the welfare gains of the regulation by less than 0.7% of variable costs per year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>StartUp.Cost</th>
<th>Var.Cost</th>
<th>Proportion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006.0</td>
<td>34,745</td>
<td>3,211,787</td>
<td>1.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007.0</td>
<td>29,251</td>
<td>3,555,853</td>
<td>0.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008.0</td>
<td>28,490</td>
<td>3,253,060</td>
<td>0.88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009.0</td>
<td>19,363</td>
<td>2,533,920</td>
<td>0.76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009.1</td>
<td>6,130</td>
<td>809,729</td>
<td>0.76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010.1</td>
<td>19,138</td>
<td>1,768,535</td>
<td>1.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011.1</td>
<td>46,458</td>
<td>3,188,179</td>
<td>1.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012.1</td>
<td>45,600</td>
<td>4,121,688</td>
<td>1.11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Market Power and Consumer Welfare

The previous section shows that productive efficiency has risen since the introduction of centralized unit commitment dispatch; it is natural, then, to ask what the impact on aggregate welfare has been. As we described in the previous section, counterfactual (simulated) prices are lower than actual prices, suggesting that even though productive efficiency has increased the benefits may not have been passed on to consumers who have apparently experienced price increases. Moreover, if we assume that aggregate demand is elastic (at least in the long run), it is possible that overall
welfare has decreased due to a decline in allocative efficiency. In this section we do not measure the change in consumer welfare but focus on market power to determine if generators have indeed increased their ability to exercise market power after the resolution of 2009.

Figure 6 shows net capacity, average available capacity, average daily generation and monthly average spot price. The graph suggests that there isn't a capacity or firm energy shortage in the Colombian electricity sector although the difference between firm energy and aggregate demand has narrowed. However, while this gap may have an effect on the opportunity costs of water, it should not have a direct effect on thermal plants’ behavior unless they exercise market power so as to exploit strategically potential future water shortages and risk-averse behavior by hydro plants. Given the difficulty of determining opportunity costs for hydro plants, which would require a stochastic dynamic programming model, we do not study bid markups for these plants. The point is that these phenomena, in a competitive setting, may affect the relative amount of thermal energy being used and hence the market clearing prices but should not be a determinant of thermal plants’ bidding behavior.

![Generation and Capacity vs Price](image)

*Figure 6: Average daily generation, average daily available capacity, average daily net capacity (upper panel) and average monthly price (lower panel).*
Figure 7: Average observed price by day before and after the reform

The previous section has made the case for the efficiency gains attributable to Resolution 051/2009. We have also noted that the observed spot price is higher relative to what would have happened if Resolution 051/2009 had not been implemented. This suggests that consumer surplus has decreased and, if efficiency has increased, then it must have been the case that that efficiency gains have not been passed on to consumers. We first address our claim regarding market power. Obviously, our statement is based on our determination of marginal costs. Nevertheless, the following set of calculations suggests that the results are quite robust.

We first show our results on bid price markups for dispatched plants.\textsuperscript{23} Next we qualify our results based on calculations that take into account some market phenomena that we may be missing in our approach; specifically, periods in which the assumption of a unique operating fuel might result in underestimating the true marginal costs of thermal plants. Furthermore, a period of government intervention may cast doubts on the determination of competitive market outcomes. We address these issues in the last section where we examine the role of contracts in determining consumer welfare.

\textsuperscript{23} Similar results hold when we only consider inframarginal bid price markups.
a) Bid Markups

Figure 8 shows the weighted average by capacity of bid markup for dispatched plants before and after 2009.

![Bid Mark-up by hour of day](image)

Figure 8: Average bid markup by hour of day, thermal dispatched plants

b) Controlling for plants using liquid fuel

So far, an important simplification in our analysis is the use of only one type of fuel for each thermal plant (the one used in the most common configuration of the plant). In reality this is not always the case since plants change fuels according to their configuration, costs and supply constraints. Of particular importance is the case when plants have used liquid fuels, which are generally more expensive than coal or gas. Therefore, we calculate which plants and in what periods (after 2009) plants used liquid fuels for operation and we omit such periods and these plants from the calculation of bid prices. This procedure will clearly underestimate market power and provide a conservative measure of noncompetitive behavior.

Figure 9 shows how much energy is produced by plants using liquid fuels. Figure 10 shows the recalculated bid markup. The result is robust to PPI inflation (see next subsection).
**Figure 9:** Proportion of thermal generation using liquid fuels, of all thermal generation (moving average)

**Figure 10:** Average bid markup by hour of day, thermal dispatched plants before (Pre) and after the reform (Post).
c) Periods of government intervention and PPI inflation

Finally, market participants have raised concerns regarding a period between 2009 and 2010 in which the government intervened in the market. We take this period as starting on October 2, 2009 (Resolution MME 18-1686) and ending on June 2, 2010 (Resolution CREG 070, 2010). The following figure (Figure 11) omits this period and controls for producer’s price index inflation.

d) Contracts

Our final calculations take into consideration that there is a significant portion of electricity transactions that take place through bilateral long term contracts so that consumers are not fully exposed to the spot market. Nevertheless, even if the spot price is not the most relevant price and the focus shifts to the price of bilateral contracts, our claims are still indicative of the fact that productive efficiency gains have not been passed on to consumers. First, as the Figure 12 shows, even though contracted energy constitutes a high proportion of energy demand for the period under study, it is still below 100%. Second, one would expect forward prices to be correlated with the settlement price.

![Bid Mark-up by hour of day, Thermal Dispatched Plants](image)

*Figure 11: Average bid markup by hour of the day, thermal dispatched plants before (Pre) and after the reform (Post).*
However, rather than dwelling on the theory of forward prices and their relation to the price of the underlying asset, we examine below the available data regarding the Colombian bilateral contract market. Specifically, the next figure shows the average contract price per month for four different kinds of users: regulated (Ur), unregulated (Unr), intermediaries (Inter) and all users (All). Time series are expressed in December 2012 constant prices. The figure shows that there has been a substantial increase in the average price of contracts since 2009.
6. Conclusion

This paper evaluates the effect of Resolution CREG 051/2009 (transition to centralized unit commitment) on the performance of the electricity market in Colombia. We find that productive efficiency has improved since the implementation of the resolution, that is, the total cost of producing electricity has been reduced. This indicates a positive impact of the resolution. On the other hand, we also find that markups have increased since 2009, suggesting an increase in the exercise of market power by producers. This observation is consistent with findings for the United Kingdom and Ireland, which have also implemented centrally committed dispatch through market reforms.

From the two previous points, we conclude that although productive efficiency has increased, the larger share of the efficiency gains were appropriated by the energy producers, rather than passed on to consumers. Our results show that under different model specifications there is evidence supporting the claim that Resolution CREG 051/2009 resulted in a positive welfare effect at least in terms of productive efficiency. This is despite the fact that simulated prices, reflecting what would have happened if the resolution had not been implemented, were lower than the observed ones.

In spite of all the caveats regarding the calculation of marginal prices in our analysis, our results are robust.24 Our analysis shows that even when accounting for government intervention, when expensive liquid fuels where the rule, there is still a significant increase in markups after 2009, which is reflected in the bids and the resulting spot prices. Furthermore, although most of the energy supplied to retail customers is contracted forward and as such insulated from spot price volatility, both theoretical and empirical evidence suggest that the persistent higher spot prices due to increased markups are correlated with forward contract prices. This, in turn, indirectly results in increased retail prices. Thus, the higher spot prices after 2009 and the observed increase in average forward contract prices present strong evidence that the productive efficiency gains have not benefited consumers.

The question of overall efficiency still remains unclear. If demand is elastic, lower retail prices would have also produced allocative efficiency gains. However, since retail prices have increased it is possible that allocative efficiency decreased by more than the productive efficiency gains, such that social welfare has actually declined since Regulation 51 was implemented.

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